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LOADING AND UNLOADING UNDER THE STANDARD
AUTOMOBILE POLICY*
BY P. MAGARICK**
Section (c) of the declaration concerning the purposes for which the
automobile is to be used states: "Use of the automobile for the purposes
stated includes the loading and unloading thereof." This wording remains
unchanged from the original wording in the first Standard Automobile
Policy. The explanatory reference note in the original edition of the policy
permitted optional placing of the wording concerning loading and unloading
in the conditions, rather than the declarations, if so desired.' Subsequent
revisions of the Standard Automobile Policy have permitted optional place-
ment in the insuring agreements, as well as the conditions or the declarations.
For the most part, however, the wording concerning loading and unloading
was, and continues to be, found in the declarations section of the Standard
Automobile Policy. Since the words of the loading and unloading clause
are so intimately connected with the insuring agreement concerning the
ownership, maintenance and use of the automobile and have been held to
be an extension of this insuring agreement, it would certainly seem as though
this would be the more logical place to incorporate the loading and unloading
clause.
The wording of the clause seems plain enough. Coverage depends on
some causal relationship between the accident and the act of loading and
unloading the insured vehicle. There are, however, so many varied situ-
ations that can and have touched upon loading or unloading operations, either
directly or remotely, that what initially appears to be disarmingly uncompli-
cated wording can and does become quite complex on occasion. In the
simplest possible terms, "loading" consists of getting an object onto or into
a truck or automobile, and "unloading" consists of taking an object from
or out of a truck or automobile. Obviously, however, there must be a be-
ginning and an end to the process and therein lies the rub. At what point
does loading begin, and exactly when does unloading end?
* This Article and its forerunner, The Application and Declarations in the Standard
Automobile Insurance Policy, 66 DICK. L. REV. 403 (1962), are advance printings of
portions of Mr. Magarick's proposed book.
** LL.B., 1929, Dickinson School of Law; LL.M., 1939, Brooklyn Law School
of the St. Lawrence University; member, American Bar Association, New York County
Lawyers Association, International Association of Insurance Counsel, Federation of
Insurance Counsel, American Insurance Association; Secretary & General Claims Man-
ager, American International Underwriters Corporation; author, SUCCESSFUL HANDLING
OF CASUALTY CLAIMS, CASUALTY INVESTIGATION CHECK LISTS, and numerous articles
in legal and insurance publications.
1. For an extensive treatment of the individual declarations in the Standard
Automobile Policy, see Magarick, The Application and Declarations in the Standard




In defining the loading and unloading operations, two principal legal
doctrines have evolved: the Coming to Rest rule and the Complete Operations
rule. Of the two, the Coming to Rest doctrine is the narrower minority
view and the one which is becoming more and more outweighed by the
trend of modern decisions. Under this theory, loading is the period of time
which begins when the object is last picked up and kept in continuous move-
ment, without interruption, pause or rest necessitating setting down of the
object, until it is placed on or in the vehicle. Unloading is that period of
time which begins when the object is first picked up from the vehicle and
kept in continuous movement without interruption, until it is set down at
its first place of rest outside the vehicle.
2
The Complete Operations rule, by far the majority view and certainly
the present trend, is much more difficult to define since there is no uniformity
in the decisions professing to hold to this doctrine. Generally speaking, under
this theory loading begins when the object is first picked up en route to the
vehicle and unloading ends when the object has reached its delivery point
or final destination. The number of temporary or intermediate stops or
resting places is immaterial under this doctrine, since the loading or un-
loading operation is not terminated until the object has finally been placed
in the hands of the receiver and at the properly designated reception point.
3
2. American Cas. Co. v. Fisher, 195 Ga. 136, 23 S.E.2d 395 (1942); St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 216 Minn. 103, 11 N.W.2d 794 (1943) ;
Franklin Co-op. Creamery Ass'n v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 200 Minn. 230,
273 N.W. 809 (1937) (teams policy with a loading and unloading clause); American
Oil & Supply Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 7, 18 A.2d 257 (Sup. Ct.
1940) ; Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 118 N.J.L.
317, 192 Ati. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N.W.
629 (1937). In some cases the doctrine is not specifically stated, but the effect is the
same. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. United Corp., 35 F. Supp. 570 (D. Mass. 1940);
Jackson Floor Covering Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 117 N.J.L. 401, 189 Atl. 84 (Sup.
Ct. 1937) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., 335 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960).
3. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Corp., 252 F.2d 463 (1st Cir.
1958) (sofa being lowered from upstairs porch to truck and plaintiff fell off porch
while assisting) ; Red Ball Motor Freight Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
189 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1951); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dalton Coal Co., 184 F.2d 181
(8th Cir. 1950); Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1944)
(bus driver responsible where child alighted from school bus, walked in front of it
while it was parked and was struck by passing truck) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez,
190 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1961) ; American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply
& Lumber Co., 179 F. Supp. 699 (D. Md. 1959); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Tighe, 29
F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Cal. 1939), aft'd, 115 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1940) (after making
delivery, driver ran toward truck to get more vegetables and hit pedestrian); Coulter
v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 33 IIl. App. 631, 78 N.E.2d 131 (1948); August
A. Busch & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 239, 158 N.E.2d 351 (1959);
State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v. District Court, 110 Mont. 250, 100 P.2d 932
(1940); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Nashua Lumber Co., 103 N.H. 107, 167 A.2d
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A number of cases have been decided on the basis of the Complete Operations
theory without a statement of the doctrine itself.4
Use of the Automobile
Some of the cases which have been decided without mention of either
the Coming to Rest theory or the Complete Operations theory have merely
stated that the facts fall within the loading and unloading clause, but a great
number of them have been based merely on the determination whether or
not the accident arose out of the use of the vehicle involved.
Insuring agreement I, coverage A and B (bodily injury and property
damage liability) of the Standard Automobile Policy reads:
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting
681 (1961); Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 304 JN.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d
592 (1952) (department store manager, while "checking" loading of a truck, turned
and bumped into pedestrian and was "using" the truck despite the fact he was neither
loading nor unloading); Lamberti v. Anaco Equip. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 121, 226
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1962); Hudson River Concrete Products Corp. v. Callanan Road Im-
provement Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 803, 168 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1957) ; Mohawk Valley
Fuel Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 445, 165 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Lowry v. R. H. Macy & Co., 119 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952); B & D Motor Lines
v. Citizens Cas. Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App.
Div. 955, 48 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1944) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas.
Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 17, 145 A.2d 15 (1958), affirming 48 N.J. Super. 314, 137 A.2d 577
(1958) ; Turtletaub v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 26 N.J. Misc. 316, 62 A.2d 830
(Dist. Ct. 1948); Wheeler v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 292 Pa. 156, 140 AtI. 855
(1928); Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500, 161 P.2d
423 (1945) ; London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. C. B. White & Bros., 188 Va. 195, 49
S.E.2d 254 (1948) ; Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 264
Wis. 230, 58 N.W.2d 646 (1953).
4. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 287 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1961)
Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Cassety, 119 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1941); Federal Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co.,
172 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1960); Bituminous
Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954) ; London Guar.
& .cc. Co. v. Shafer, 35 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Ohio 1940); Columbia So. Chem. Corp.
v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 11 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 369,
334 P.2d 658 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Raffel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 141 Conn. 389,
106 A.2d 716 (1954); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 22 Ill.
App. 2d 26, 159 N.E.2d 7 (1959); Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Mach. Inc., 90 So. 2d
417 (La. Ct. App. 1956); Lang v. Jersey Gold Creameries, 172 So. 2d 389 (La.
Ct. App. 1937) ; Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944);
Kemnetz v. Galluzzo, 8 Misc. 2d 513,. 163 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1957); R. H.
Macy & Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 89, 148 N.Y.S.2d
10 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; Krasilovsky Bros. Trucking Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 54
N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945); Bobier v. National Cas. Co., 143 Ohio St. 215,
54 N.E.2d 798 (1944); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
110 Ohio App. 363, 163 N.E.2d 46 (1959) ; Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Brock, 215
S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.5
Some decisions based on the use of the automobile have been made
without consideration of the loading and unloading clause.6 Other cases
are decided on the basis of the use of the vehicle and a determination whether
the loading or unloading operation was involved.
7
The decisions in one group of cases make a special point of using the
word "delivery" in arriving at a conclusion.8 Some of these cases fall under
the Complete Operations rule; others use the word "delivery" without
reference to either rule and fall on both sides of the fence.
Causal Relationship
One small group of cases decided principally in Illinois and Pennsyl-
vania holds that there must be some causal connection or relationship
between the use of the vehicle and the accident. These cases appear to be
5. Emphasis added.
6. Owens v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 194 Ark. 817, 109 S.W.2d 928 (1937)
(employees dropped stretcher on which woman was being carried to ambulance) ; Ocean
Ace. & Guar. Corp. v. J. B. Pound Hotel Co., 69 Ga. App. 447, 26 S.E.2d 116 (1943)
(accident occurred an hour after oil had been unloaded from truck) ; Morgan v.
New York Cas. Co., 54 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E. 581 (1936); Kienstra v. Madison
County Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 Ill. App. 238, 44 N.E.2d 944 (1942) (no loading
and unloading provision) ; General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hanley Oil Co.,
321 Mass. 72, 72 N.E.2d 1 (1947); Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W.2d 412 (1958) ; Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 4;
Hudson River Concrete Products Corp. v. Callanan Road Improvement Co., supra
note 3.
7. Kaufman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1959); Connecticut
Indem. Co. v. Lee, rupra note 4 (cellar doors were opened by driver who left scene
to pick up a box and pedestrian fell into opening) ; Commercial Standard Ins. Co.
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 272 Ala. 357, 131 So. 2d 182 (1961) (nursery salesman
had placed shrubbery in the car and after talking with customer for 3 or 4 minutes
closed the door on the fingers of the customer's baby) ; American Auto. Ins.
Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 106 Cal. App. 630, 235 P.2d 645 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951) (oil being unloaded from tank trailer overflowed and polluted nearby
water) ; Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp. v. J. B. Pound Hotel Co., supra note 6; Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 170 Ohio St. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961);
Thompson Heating Corp. v. Hardware Indem. Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 35, 58 N.E.2d
809 (1944) (pedestrian fell over hose extending across sidewalk leading from truck
to house) ; Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A.2d 493 (1944);
Handley v. Oakley, 10 Wash. 2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941) ; Smedley v. Milwaukee
Auto. Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 460, 107 N.W.2d 625 (1961).
8. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 251 F.2d 761 (7th
Cir. 1958) (not covered under auto policy); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cassety, supra
note 4 (policy expressly covered "delivery and use") ; Commercial Standard Ins. Co.
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., supra note 7 (not covered under auto policy) ; Caron v.
American Motorists' Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 156, 178 N.E. 286 (1931) (not covered under
auto policy and accident held not to arise out of "delivery") ; Wheeler v. London
Guar. & Ace. Co., supra note 3 (covered by auto policy and "loading" held to
include "delivery") ; London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. C. B. White & Bros., supra note 3
(covered under auto policy and Complete Operations doctrine stated).
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saying that the mere use of the vehicle out of which the accident arises is
not enough to warrant coverage under the automobile policy and that there
must be some direct connection between this use and the accident.
Of the two Illinois cases holding causal relationship to be essential,
Kienstra v. Madison County Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.9 involved a policy that
had no loading and unloading clause. In this case the trucker's employee
was delivering a cake of ice to a customer's house. The ice slipped out of
the employee's hands and struck a small boy in the customer's yard. The
court held that there was no causal relationship between the use of the truck
and the accident and, therefore, no coverage under the automobile policy.
The second Illinois case, General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Brown,'0
involved a trucker's employee who was loading a truck at the customer's
plant. While doing so, he fell and injured his leg as a result of alleged
defective premises. The court conceded that the truck was being used by
the customer and that loading was taking place, but stated that there
must be a causal connection between the use of the truck and the injury
and held that in this case there was no such causal connection.
Kaufman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." involved a driver and his helper
who had placed a barrel of beer on the sidewalk after taking it from a truck.
The helper went into the cellar, started to open the cellar doors and, in the
process, injured a passing pedestrian. The court held that the loading and un-
loading clause of the automobile policy applies only where there is a "connection
between the accident and the use of the vehicle insured," and since the beer
truck was not "in active operation and use" there was no coverage under the
automobile policy. In Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co.,12 the driver of a truck
went into the basement to pick up some ashes. He set the can of ashes on the
steps leading to the sidewalk and then went into the building to push up the
cellar doors. In the process, he injured a pedestrian. The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania held that "there must be a connection between the accident
and the use of the vehicle." The court further stated that the cause of the
injury was too remote from the vehicle or the container to be considered
"loading" and that there was no "use" of the truck since the accident was
not caused by the articles being transported.
Time Interval
Although the courts rarely refer specifically to the time lag or interval
between the removal of the truck or automobile from the premises and the
accident, some such distinction should be made and discussed separately.
9. Supra note 6. Accord, Caron v. American Motorists' Ins. Co., supra note 8.
10. 35 Ill. App. 2d 43, 181 N.E.2d 191 (1962).
11. Supra note 7.
12. Supra note 7.
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Many of these cases involving an interval of anywhere from one-half hour
to one week between the time the truck left the scene and the time when the
accident occurred have been decided on the basis of the Complete Operations
theory, holding that coverage was afforded under the loading and unloading
clause of the automobile policy. 13 In those states applying the Coming to
Rest theory, however, any time lag would take the accident out of the scope
of automobile coverage under the loading and unloading clause, since the
operation would have been considered terminated when the object being
moved first came to rest.'
4
In some cases involving time interval, the decisions holding that auto-
mobile coverage under loading and unloading did not apply were based on
the fact that either delivery had been completed and the object placed in the
position intended, or simply on the basis that loading or unloading had
terminated and the accident did not occur during the periods of loading or
unloading.15 In two instances the courts did not mention either the time
interval, the Complete Operations theory or the Coming to Rest theory
and simply held that the incidents were covered under the automobile policy
because the accident arose out of the use of the truck.16
There are a few cases where the courts make mention of the time interval
factor. In Raffel v. Travelers Indem. Co.,17 for example, a householder bought
some linoleum and the store sent a roll of it to her home with instructions
to cut off what she needed and return the remainder. The roll was delivered
and left standing on end on the porch. Some time later it fell over onto the
householder's daughter and injured her. The Connecticut court held that
this case came under the loading and unloading clause of the automobile
policy and went so far as to state that unloading did not end until the linoleum
was placed where it could be used. Even though this case does not mention
13. Red Ball Motor Freight Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., supra note 3
(time interval not stated); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dalton Coal Co., supra note 3
(31/2 hours); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber Co., rupra
note 3 ("sometime later") ; London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Shafer, supra note 4 (time
interval unknown) ; Lang v. Jersey Gold Creameries, supra note 4 (1 week) ; American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Nashua Lumber Co., supra note 3 (occurred "sometime after
delivery") ; Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 7 App. Div.
2d 853, 181 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1959) (1 hour and 40 minutes); Mohawk Valley Fuel
Co. v. Home Indem. Co., supra note 3 (time interval not stated); London Guar.
& Acc. Co. v. C. B. White & Bros., supra note 3 (time interval not stated).
14. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., supra note 2 (time
interval not mentioned).
15 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra note 8 ("sometime
later") ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. United Corp. of Mass., supra note 2 (time interval
not stated) ; Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp. v. J. B. Pound Hotel Co., supra note 7 (time
interval not stated) ; Morgan v. New York Cas. Co., supra note 6 ("sometime later").
16. John Alt Furniture Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 88 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1937)
(Y2 hour) ; Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 4 (time interval not stated).
17. Supra note 4.
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the exact time lag, the logical assumption is that if the roll remained on the
householder's porch a week, a month or even a year, the case would still
come under the loading and unloading clause since the linoleum had not
actually been placed on the floor. This and similar cases seem to call for
some remark from the court to the effect that the time lag should not be
allowed to go beyond a reasonable period.1
8
In Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.,1 a truck
had to be moved from a space where it was double parked after sidewalk
cellar doors had been opened in order to deliver beer. During the period
when the truck was being moved, a pedestrian fell into the cellar door opening.
The Wisconsin court held that no time had needlessly elapsed between the
driver's opening of the trap door and the intended continuing movement of
the beer into the basement for storage, and accordingly held that coverage
fell under the loading and unloading clause of the automobile policy.
Miscellaneous Cases
Some cases do not fall into any particular pattern, cannot be categorized,
and hence have not been previously discussed in detail; however, they do
warrant individual consideration.
The case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdes2" involved a Michigan statute
which provides that it is unlawful to have a shotgun in an automobile unless
it is unloaded and carried in the trunk. Three of a party of four men had
already placed their unloaded guns in the trunk of their auto. The insured
was still hunting. After he had finished, he stood about twenty-five feet
from the automobile and began ejecting shells in the process of unloading his
gun so that he too could put his unloaded gun in the car. In the process
he slipped and the shotgun went off, killing one of the members of the party.
The court held that since the insured was fulfilling a legal obligation by
ejecting shells preparatory to loading his shotgun into the trunk of his car,
the act was part of the loading operation of the automobile and was covered
under the automobile policy. There has been quite a bit of humorous comment
concerning this case, most of which resulted from a confusion concerning the
18. In General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hanley Oil Co., supra note 6,
oil was being pumped into a tank in a home from an oil tank truck. The oil over-
flowed into the cellar and several hours later, after the truck had left the scene, the
oil became ignited and burned the house. The Massachusetts court held that the
accident arose out of the use of the truck and it was therefore not necessary to decide
whether the accident arose out of loading and unloading. The court did specifically
mention the time element but stated that in a case like 'this no time limit could be
set since the oil in an improper receptacle was a continuous agency for harm. Accord,
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Crow, 164 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1947) (oil overflowed
and later ignited, destroying a mill).
19. Supra note 3.
20. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdes, supra note 3.
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loading of the automobile and the unloading of the shotgun. Nevertheless, in
view of the requirements of the statute, the decision has some basis in logic.
In Hartford Acc. & Indent. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co.,21 a truck
driver was attempting to make a delivery of propane gas in cylinders carried
on the truck. The driver had parked his truck and was attempting to locate
the correct house where the delivery was to be made. Of two homes in the
immediate vicinity, he went to the wrong one and there opened a valve on
a propane gas cylinder, which valve led into an open basement. The driver
subsequently learned of his mistake but neglected to shut off the valve.
He delivered a tank of gas to the right house and then drove off. About
four hours later an explosion occurred in the basement of the home where
he had mistakenly opened the valve. The trucker's insurance carriers settled
the claim and brought an action against the trucker's liability carrier for
reimbursement. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the truck
driver's act in turning on the valve in the wrong house had nothing to do
with the unloading of the propane gas cylinder, which was supposed to be
delivered in a different house, nor did the truck have anything to do with
the negligent act of the driver. The court further stated that the fact that
unloading had not been completed was immaterial as long as the negligent
act bore no relationship to the unloading operation. Up to this point the
decision appears logical and correct, but the court then went on to say that
Illinois recognizes the Complete Operations rule and declared that this case
falls within that rule. The decision should not have been concerned with
the Complete Operations rule, and had this rule applied the result should
have been the opposite. Actually, the court seems to have completely mis-
construed this doctrine.
In Gamble-Skogmo Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.,22 an employee
of a customer where a delivery was being made was assisting in the assembling
of a complicated piece of machinery on the truck from which it was to be
unloaded. In the course of this work, he was injured due to faulty instructions
concerning the assembling of the machine. The Michigan court held that
while the injury undoubtedly arose out of the unloading operation, the
assembling of the machinery was not considered to be a use of the automobile
and the accident was accordingly not covered under the automobile policy.
This is one of several cases in which the court stated that the injury arose
as a result of a business risk of the seller rather than out of the use of the
automobile.
In Eastern Chems. Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co.,23 a truck which was
21. 298 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1962).
22. 242 Minn. 91, 64 N.W.2d 380 (1954).
23. 23 Misc. 2d 1024, 199 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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hauling chemicals was being unloaded. At one point, however, "when there
was no activity in the unloading process, one of the containers on the truck
exploded" resulting in injury to the truck driver. This was a declaratory
judgment action between the chemical company and the automobile insurer
for the trucker. The New York court held that there was no coverage under
the automobile policy for either the named insured or the chemical company
because there was no allegation of negligence in the loading or unloading and
because no act of loading or unloading was taking place at the time. In
Moore-McCormick Lines v. Maryland Cas. Co.,2 which at first glance seems
to go against the weight of authority in New York, an employee of a trucker
was injured while loading bags onto a truck from a ship. In this instance,
however, the allegation of negligence was directed entirely against the ship-
owner for improper stacking of the bags. The court accordingly held that
since no negligence had been alleged in the loading or unloading operation,
there was no coverage under the automobile policy.
Handley v. Oakley25 involved an ice cream truck which was parked near
a baseball field. The driver of the truck was dispensing ice cream to a
boy purchaser when a foul ball hit the boy. The court held that the injury
was not connected with the act of unloading the ice cream and the proximate
cause of the injury was the ballgame. The accident did not arise out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
In a relatively early New Jersey case,2 6 a milkman, in the process of
arranging the ice in an icebox after the milk had been delivered, had his ice
pick sticking out of his back pocket. A passerby was injured by the pro-
truding ice pick. The court held that unloading had been completed and
that there was accordingly no coverage under the automobile policy.
The Omnibus Clause
As previously shown, the ownership, maintenance and use of the truck
ties in with the loading and unloading clause, and it is now necessary to
examine both of these provisions in connection with the omnibus clause.
Paragraph III of the insuring agreements, entitled "Definition of Insured"
(otherwise known as the omnibus clause), reads:
With respect to the insurance for Bodily Injury Liability and
for Property Damage Liability the unqualified word "insured"
includes the named insured and, if the named insured is an indi-
vidual, his spouse if a resident of the same household, and also
includes any person while using the automobile and any person or
24. 181 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
25. Supra note 7.




organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the
actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spouse
or with the permission of either.
2 7
If an outsider who is helping to load or unload a truck is also using
it, 28 he is probably doing so with permission of the insured. It then follows
quite naturally that this outsider becomes an "insured" under the policy
according to the language of the omnibus clause. 29 It also becomes obvious
that the firm for which he is working and who may be held legally responsible
for his acts is also an insured under the policy by virtue of the fact that it
may be legally responsible for the use of the vehicle. 0 In a very recent
27. Emphasis added.
28. In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., supra note 7, a tank truck
was parked preparing to load fuel oil. A pipe being moved toward the truck discharged
oil onto the driver knocking him off the truck before the loading operation had actually
begun. In an action for declaratory judgment against the truck carrier to get coverage
as an omnibus insured for Gulf Oil Corporation, the party charged with negligence,
the court held that the loading and unloading clause is of no consequence unless or
until the party charged with negligence is shown to have been using the truck.
Since the act that caused the injury related only to Gulf's operations, the company
was not using the truck and the loading and unloading clause did not apply.
29. But see Nichols & Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 N.E.2d 593 (Mass. 1962),
where an employee of a truck owner was dropping bales of wool to Nichols' employees
who were standing on the ground. One of the bales hit a passerby and Nichols brought
a declaratory judgment action to get coverage under the loading and unloading clause
of the trucker's policy. The court held that in order for Nichols to become an omnibus
insured, his employees had to be responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle.
The court stated that their participation in unloading was immaterial, and since they
were not responsible for the operation of the truck they were not omnibus insureds.
This decision completely disregards the fact that the loading and unloading clause
must be interpreted in conjunction with the use of the vehicle and is an extension
of the ownership, maintenance and use insuring agreement.
30. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Old Dominion Hoisting Serv., 251 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (owner of crane held omnibus insured under automobile policy); American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 19 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(receiver of steel blocks was held to be an omnibus insured under the trucker's policy) ;
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., supra note 4 (customer's employee
was unloading and customer was covered as ominibus insured under automobile policy) ;
Garvey v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 125 So. 2d 634 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (employee
of food market who was delivering groceries to a customer's car injured child in
car, and court held employee and employer covered under omnibus clause); Woodrich
Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra note 6 (general contractor who had complete
control of turntable upon which truck was being unloaded was held to be an omnibus
insured under the truck policy) ; Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., supra note 3
(department store manager who was checking suits being loaded onto truck and who
bumped pedestrian was held to have been using the truck, and accordingly was an
omnibus insured) ; Stole v. United States Steel Corp., 34 Misc. 2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d
595 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (erecting contractor was covered as an omnibus insured under
the automobile policy of the trucker) ; D'Aquilla Bros. Contracting Co. v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 22 Misc. 2d 733, 193 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (automobile
policy was held to cover subcontractor's employee under the omnibus clause) ; R. H.
Macy & Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., supra note 4 (Macy's was held
to be an omnibus insured under the trucker's policy) ; Lowry v. R. H. Macy & Co.,
supra note 3; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 178 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio
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New Mexico case, 31 "Service Company" was involved in the job of cementing
an oil well, and "Rowland" was furnishing the water for this operation.
While "Service" was pumping cement from their truck into the casing, a
pocket of oil and gas escaped and exploded, injuring two men and killing
two others. The general liability carrier for the Southern California Petro-
leum Corporation settled the claims and brought suits against the two auto-
mobile carriers for "Service" and "Rowland." The Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that omnibus coverage extends only to persons who are legally
responsible for the vehicle or who are using it. Since Southern California
Petroleum Corporation was admittedly not operating or using the vehicles,
the fact that unloading might have been involved was not enough. The
court held that the accident resulted from the negligent acts of the Southern
California Petroleum Company and released the two automobile carriers
from responsibility.
Severability of Interests
As pointed out previously, it is usually impossible to make a clear-cut
coverage determination on the basis of one particular clause of the policy
since they are so often interrelated. Where the injury or damage involves
a third party who is not an employee of the omnibus insured, there is no
need to delve further concerning coverage under the omnibus clause. Where,
however, coverage is extended to an omnibus insured in a case that involves
injury to an employee of the named insured, there is an additional problem
regarding employee exclusion that requires further discussion. Exclusion (d)
reads as follows:
This policy does not apply under Coverage A, to bodily injury to
or sickness, disease or death of any employee of the insured arising
out of and in the course of (1) domestic employment by the insured
if benefits therefor are in whole or in part either payable or re-
quired to be provided under any Workmen's Compensation Law,
or (2) other employment by the insured.
Even before the severability of interests condition was added to the
Standard Automobile Policy some courts were interpreting the employee
exclusion as being applicable only against an employer if he was the em-
Ct. App. 1961) (grocery store owner and employee held omnibus insureds under auto
policy of private passenger car); Coletrain v. Coletrain, 238 S.C. 555, 121 S.E.2d
89 (1961) (husband, while getting out of a taxi, closed the door on the hand of his
wife, and the court held this to be unloading and gave omnibus coverage to the
husband as being one who was using the cab) ; Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, supra
note 4 (on return trip from Panhandle's quarry, rock fell from truck hitting wind-
shield of passing car, injuring passenger, and court held trucker's auto policy covered
Panhandle as an omnibus insured as a result of improper loading).




ployer of the employee who was injured.3 2 For example, this exclusion was
not applied by some of the courts against a named insured if the injured
claimant was an employee of an omnibus insured or vice versa. This inter-
pretation permits recovery in the case of an employee of the named insured
injured by the omnibus insured.
When the severability of interests clause was added to the policy, it
was an attempt to clear up any misunderstanding once and for all. This
clause reads as follows: "The term 'the insured' is used severally and not
collectively, but the inclusion herein of more than one insured shall not
operate to increase the limits of the Company's liability." We are not
concerned in this particular discussion with an increase in the company's
possible exposure, but the first part of this condition makes it clear beyond
any doubt that the employee exclusion refers only to the employee of the
particular insured claiming coverage under the policy. 33 Despite the severa-
bility clause, some courts have arrived at what might be considered wrong
decisions in that they are at variance with the wording and intent of the
policies.3 4 In Transport Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,35 there was a sever-
ability clause in the policy and the court incorrectly held that the employee
exclusion did apply. In that case a truck was being loaded with diesel
fuel on the property of Standard Oil Company when an explosion occurred,
injuring the truck driver. The lower court correctly held that Standard Oil
was covered as an omnibus insured and was not excluded from coverage
32. See Risjord & Austin, Who Is the Insured?, 24 U. KAN. CITY L. Rav. 65,
70-74 (1955).
33. Federal Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., supra note 4; United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Church, 107 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd sub not.
Canadian Indem. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 213 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1954)
Travelers Ins. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 187 F. Supp. 234 (D. Idaho 1960)
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954)
Canadian Indem. Co. v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 174 F. Supp. 71 (D. Ore. 1959)
(employee exclusion did not apply since the injured was not employed by the partic-
ular insured being sued) ; Columbia So. Chem. Corp. v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers
Indem. Exch., supra note 4 (truck driver injured but employee exclusion not effective
against defendant) ; Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal.
App. 2d 369, 334 P.2d 658 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers
& Warehouse Ass'n v. California Farm Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 126, 298 P.2d
109 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. (Cas.) Ins.
Co., 28 N.J. 17, 145 A.2d 15 (1958), affirming 48 N.J. Super. 314, 137 A.2d 577
(1958) (employee exclusion applies only against the employer of that particular insured
seeking coverage); Greaves v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 120, 155 N.E.2d
390, 181 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1959), affirming 4 App. Div. 2d 609, 168 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1957)
(employee exclusion did not apply in view of the severability clause) ; Employers' Liab.
Assur. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 167 N.E.2d 142 (C.P.
1959).
34. See American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 248 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1957) ; General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Brown, supra note 10;
Simpson v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 327 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
35. 337 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. 1960).
[Vol. 67
STANDARD AUTOMOBILE POLICY
since the injured party was not an employee of Standard. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the decision in spite of the severability
clause and, for some unknown reason, decided that Standard was not an
omnibus insured.
Overlapping Coverage
Until recent years, a large portion of the suits arising out of the loading
and unloading clause developed because of the controversy concerning cov-
erage between the general or public liability insurance carrier on the premises
where the loading or unloading was being done and the trucker's automobile
insurer.
The wording of the general liability policy, exclusion (A), reads as
follows: "This policy does not apply (a) . . .to the ownership, maintenance,
operation, use, loading or unloading of (1) automobiles, if the accident occurs
away from the premises."36 The general liability policy also defines "premises"
as "the ways immediately adjoining on land." At least by implication where
the loading or unloading is being done either on the assured's premises or
on a street or roadway immediately adjoining the assured's premises, there
may be coverage under the general liability policy applicable to the premises.
It must, however, be kept in mind that there is no omnibus coverage under
any of the general or public liability policies. It is also to be assumed that
both the automobile and the general liability policy involved in the contro-
versy have an "other insurance" clause which would ordinarily make both
policies co-insurers.
The difficulty arises when an employee of the general liability policy-
holder is instrumental in injuring the driver or helper on the truck, or a
third party, at a time when he is assisting in the loading or unloading oper-
ations. Since the general liability policyholder's employee is not insured
under the general liability policy, were it not for the automobile policy
covering the truck under the loading and unloading clause, he personally
would be left completely without insurance protection." Because of this and
as a result of the increasing number of actions that were being brought
by one insurance company against another on this question of overlapping
coverages, the Combined Claims Committee of the Association of Casualty
Insurance Companies and the National Association of Mutual Casualty
Companies in joint action promulgated some principles on the handling of
36. Emphasis added.
37. See Brown & Risjord, Loading and Unloading: The Conflict Between Fortuitous
Adversaries, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 197 (1962), and Gowan, Loading and Unloading-
Hired Cars-Concurrent Coverage-Industry Recommendations, 26 INS. COUNSEL J.
93 (1959), for interesting and detailed discussions of this subject, including discussion
of policies involving hired and non-owned vehicles.
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this problem which were adopted by many of the companies belonging to
the two groups. It must be emphasized that these principles are advisory
only and are not binding on the signatory companies, especially in states
where the decisions contradict the principles or where an insured's interests
might be prejudiced as a result of adherence to them.
The first argreement reads as follows: "Where a vehicle is being loaded
or unloaded at a customer's premises [or other locations where there is
general liability coverage] and the driver or a member of the public is
injured by reason of the negligent actions of the employees of the customer
engaged in the loading or unloading, the auto carrier should cover." 8 For
example, suppose the truck of B is being loaded at the premises of A and
the employees of A drop a pipe, which is being loaded, on the driver of B.
The driver of B sues A. The auto carrier of B should cover. If held liable,
A would have an action against its negligent employees and since the
liability policy of A normally would not cover A's employees, the ultimate
obligation would faIl on B's auto carrier in most cases anyway. The great
weight of authority follows this recommendation. 9 The decisions that deny
coverage under the automobile policy4" and those that hold the general
carrier in as co-insurer4' do so on the basis of a variety of reasons, mostly
tortured.
Century Food Markets Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.42 involved an
38. Brackets added.
39. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Corp., supra note 3; Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 228 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. General Cas. Co. supra note 33; Federal Ins. Co. v. Michigan
Mut. Liab. Co., supra note 4; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra
note 33; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Church, supra note 33; American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., supra note 30; Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., supra note 33; Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers Ware-
house Ass'n v. California Farm Ins. Co., supra note 33; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
American Fid. & Cas. Co., supra note 4; Maryland Cas. Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas.
Ins. Co., supra note 33; Wagman v. American Fid. Cas. Co., supra note 3; Lamberti
v. Anaco Equip. Corp., supra note 3; D'Aquilla Bros. Contracting Co. v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., supra note 30; R. H. Macy & Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life
Assur. Corp., supra note 4; Lowry v. R. H. Macy & Co., supra note 3; Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 30; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 4; Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 33.
40. Pavlik v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1961) ; American
Fid. & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 248 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1957) (no
severability clause) ; Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. J. B. Pound Hotel Co., supra note 6;
Simpson v. American Auto Ins. Co., supra note 34; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buckeye
Union Cas. Co., supra note 7; Century Food Markets Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
81 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 161 N.E.2d 650 (C.P.), aff'd, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 301, 161 N.E.2d
652 (Ct. App. 1958); Smedly v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., supra note 6.
41. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., supra note 4; Ermis v. Federal Win-
dows Mfg. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 594, 97 N.W.2d 485 (1959).
42. Supra note 40.
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employee of a food market who delivered a package to the automobile of a
customer parked on the premises of the market. The employee closed the
door on the hand of the owner. The Ohio court held that there was no
coverage under the auto policy on erroneous generalities that it was incon-
sistent for the named insured to recover against his own carrier and that in
any event the coverage was provided by the general liability carrier for the
market.
In Smedly v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co.,43 involving a crane mounted
on a truck chassis, the truck, which had to be stationary and operated from a
separate power unit, caused the plaintiff to lose his balance and fall. The
court held that the operation of the crane did not involve the use or
operation of the truck. There was, accordingly, no coverage under the loading
and unloading clause of the automobile policy.
The second agreement recommended by the Combined Claims Commit-
tee reads: "Where an accident occurs by reason of defective equipment of
one insured used in loading or unloading the vehicle of another insured, the
carrier of the insured owning the defective equipment should cover." For
example, suppose the truck of B is being loaded at the premises of A by the
use of A's crane and the cable of A's crane breaks, dropping the load on
B's driver who sues A. The liability carrier of A should cover. The insurance
carriers in proposing this rule of thumb recognized that this was a trouble-
some area and that there was some conflict in the decisions of the various
states. The carriers believed that in order to avoid litigation between com-
panies and in the absence of local decisions to the contrary, adherence to this
principle was logical and fair to all in the long run.
In principle the rule seems good except that it would come into head-on
conflict with the Complete Operations theory as defined by the courts of
some of our states in some instances. In Columbia So. Chem. Corp. v.
Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 4 a truck was being loaded
with soda ash. The truck driver pulled a rope which released a loading
spout, but the rope broke and knocked the driver off the truck. The soda
ash company, owners of the rope and spout, paid the claim of the truck driver
and sued the owner of the truck. The California court held that the soda ash
company was covered as an omnibus insured under the automobile policy
because of the loading and unloading clause.
45
43. Supra note 41.
44. Supra note 4.
45. Accord, Stole v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 30 (cables, which were
attached to a crane and totally unconnected with a truck that had delivered steel beams,
were left lying across the sidewalk and a pedestrian tripped over one of them).
The conflict with the Complete Operations theory does not arise, however, where
the defective equipment belongs to the trucker. See Krasilovsky Bros. Trucking Co. v.
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In a situation where it appears the court is adhering to the Coming to
Rest doctrine, the recommended principle regarding the defective equipment
is easier to apply. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co. 46 involved a truck
which was unloading cement into a bucket. When the crane operator
attempted to lift the bucket, it buckled and killed some men in the vicinity.
The Texas court held that there was no coverage under the trucker's
automobile policy since the cement had been completely unloaded and further
held that the general liability policy covered the loss.
47
Two other cases deserve some mention at this point. The first is General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Brown 48 where a trucker's employee,
while loading the truck, was injured as a result of the allegedly defective
premises of the customer. The Illinois court held the general liability carrier
liable and declared that there was no coverage under the automobile policy
on the basis of lack of causal connection between the accident and the use of
the truck. As pointed out previously in this Article, Illinois is one of the few
states which hold that there must be some causal connection between the
use of the vehicle and the accident in order for there to be coverage under the
automobile policy.49 The other case of interest in connection with allocation
of coverage between the general liability carrier and the automobile-policy
carrier where defective equipment is involved is Canadian Indein. Co. v.
State Auto Ins. Ass'n. 0 In that case the federal district court in Oregon
held both insurers. The automobile policy covered the consignee because of
its employee's negligence, and the general liability policy of the consignee
covered the defective winch which was on a separate truck owned and
operated by the consignee and his employees.
Conclusion
In the decisions involving an interpretation of the loading and unloading
clause of the Standard Automobile Policy, two principal doctrines stand out as
being decisive in many of the cases. The Complete Operations rule holds
that loading begins when the object is first picked up en route to the vehicle,
and unloading ends when the object has reached its final delivery point or
ultimate destination. In this doctrine, the number of intermediate stops or
Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 4, where an employee was moving a power press in an
elevator cage by a power winch attached to the truck that had delivered the press. The
rope broke and damaged the elevator as well as the press. The court held that the
damage to the elevator was covered under the loading and unloading clause of the auto-
mobile policy.
46. Supra note 2.
47. See Jackson Floor Covering Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 2 (equip-
ment not defective, but if it had been, result would obviously have been the same).
48. Supra note 10.
49. See pp. 260-61 supra.
50. Supra note 33.
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resting places are immaterial. The Coming to Rest rule holds that loading is
the period of time which begins when the object is last picked up and kept
in continuous movement without interruption, pause or rest necessitating
setting down of the object, until it is placed on or in the vehicle. Unloading,
according to this doctrine, is that period of time which begins when the
object is first picked up from the vehicle and kept in continuous movement
without interruption, until it is set down at its first place of rest outside the
vehicle.
A great number of cases have been decided without reference to either
theory. Some have merely stated that the facts fall within the loading and
unloading clause, some have been decided merely on the question whether or
not the accident arose out of the use of the vehicle involved, and others have
been decided on an interpretation of both loading or unloading and use. A few
cases made a point of using the word "delivery" in arriving at a conclusion,
with no consistency in the decisions. While the time interval between the
pick-up and the accident should be an important factor in some of the de-
cisions, very few of the courts actually refer to it. A small group of cases
holds that there must be some causal connection between the use of the
vehicle and the accident.
Most cases, particularly those based on policies containing a severability
clause, hold that the consignee or customer and its employees are omnibus
insureds under the automobile policy where they have participated in the
loading or unloading. In cases of overlapping coverage involving both the
vehicle automobile policy and the general liability coverage, the Combined
Claims Committee has promulgated some principles which many companies
follow:
1. Where the vehicle is being loaded at a customer's premises and the
driver or a member of the public is injured by reason of the negligent
actions of the employees of the customer engaged in the loading or
unloading, the auto carrier should cover.
2. Where an accident occurs by reason of defective equipment of one
insured, the carrier of the insured owning the defective equipment
should cover.
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